Weapons: The Lance Missile
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By the courtesy of Andy Jones the Editor of "Windscreen"
The magazine of the Military Vehicle Trust.
DEPLOYMENT OF LANCE
50TH MISSILE REGIMENT ROYAL ARTILLERY
Background
The Lance short-range tactical nuclear missile system was introduced into service into the British Army with 50th Missile Regiment Royal Artillery in 1977. It was a direct replacement for the Honest John system and inherited the deployment philosophy and practices from that system, inasmuch as the changed equipment would allow.
This unclassified paper outlines the Lance deployment philosophy in order to inform future historical research. Further information may be obtained by reading from classified sources identified in the footnotes. Training and real deployment options are not addressed except where they are relevant to the discussion.
Honest John
Honest John was a very short range tactical nuclear weapon which saw service in the British Army throughout the 60s and for much of the 70s. During this period, deployment in North West Europe used wooded features for camouflage and as the basis for local defence. Dispersion was a factor in the deployment plan, but the major influence on deployment was the sheer size of the some of the vehicles and their relative lack of mobility.
The Early Days of Lance
The Lance system enjoyed a number of advantages over its predecessor. The launchers and loader transporters (LTs) were tracked (Self Propelled) and the warhead sections and Missile Main Assemblies (MMAs) could be carried by 4 tonne and 10 tonne (later replaced by 8 tonne) vehicles respectively. This gave the system much greater tactical mobility and increased the deployment options correspondingly. In addition, the truss from which the missile was fired could be dismounted from the tracked carrier and, through the addition of a mobility kit consisting of wheels, a towing apparatus and lighting, could be towed behind a heavy goods vehicle, underslung from a helicopter and even man-handled into position. This arrangement was known as the Lightweight Launcher (LWL) or (in American parlance) Launcher Zero Length (LZL).
The advent of Lance did not, however, herald a significant change in deployment philosophy. A battery would deploy, generally in a wood, forming a Field Storage Site (FSS) for the weapons and around which the men, vehicles and equipment would deploy to provide all-round defence. This was often referred to the ‘wagon train’ deployment. It suffered from a number of disadvantages, of which concentration, vulnerability and difficulties of command and control are but some. Launchers would be loaded with their missiles as ordered and would deploy out to firing positions to fire the mission. Once deployed for the first time, they would generally remain in remote locations, meeting up to re-load from the LTs, as required. The LWL was used to provide a form of graceful degradation of the equipment and to ensure that all launchers were available for the maximum time possible. A diagrammatic representation of this style of deployment is shown in Figure 1, below:
Figure 1. Diagrammatic Layout of Missile Battery Deployment (Old Concept)
The evolving perception of the Soviet threat dictated that deployment options had to change, however, and battery positions became more dispersed, with considerable emphasis being placed upon survivability of the nuclear warheads.
The Richards Paper
In the early 80s, the then Commanding Officer, Lieutenant Colonel Nick Richards, examined the tactical posture of the Regiment and wrote a paper that established the framework for all subsequent deployments. The rationale behind his work was founded upon four key deductions from his analysis:
Lance was a weapon of last resort and hence the principal task of the Regiment was to ensure that the weapons and delivery means remained concealed. Since the equipment had a distinctive signature, particularly when on the move, the best way to hide was for batteries to remain in one position for as long as possible. However, this dictated the requirement for a significant level of security in the event that batteries were located and attacked unexpectedly.
The Honest John type of deployment did not provide any depth to battery positions and consequently the security of both launchers and warheads was questionable.
The Lance Battery ORBAT, particularly when the US custodial platoon was included, gave the Battery Commander the manpower and support weapons to construct a properly coordinated, dispersed defence for both weapons and launchers. In essence, battery positions could be considered as combat team-sized defensive locations.
Providing that battery positions were properly camouflaged and that there was no obvious ‘nuclear artillery’ signature through typical movement patterns, then they would be very difficult to locate.
The concept was briefed to Commander 1st British Corps and the MGRA in 1983 and developed further during the 1984 training season before being evaluated on Exercise SPEARPOINT 84. On that exercise, Special Forces troops were tasked to identify and attack nuclear positions, but failed to find any Lance positions before missile firings had taken place.
The exclusion area of the FSS formed the focal point (the Vital Ground) of an infantry defensive position in which the various elements of the Battery made up the platoons, and which were dug in. OPs were deployed from the Special Defence Group (SDG) up to one kilometer away to provide early warning of incursion or attack. The FSS was supported by its own Command Post to pass orders and to control the movement of warheads and missile mating operations. The various elements comprising the ‘infantry’ platoons were drawn from the Launcher sections, the Assembly and Transport (A&T) troop, the Battery Command Post, Battery Echelon and the command elements of the Battery. This deployment scenario had the advantages of dispersion and a layered defence in depth. Deployment could be undertaken in woods, farm complexes, villages and industrial estates and use any available cover, provided that the integrity of the defence was maintained, with interlocking arcs and mutual support between the platoons. It was essential that integrity could be maintained regardless of the departure of individual launchers or the Battery Command Post when they were required to carry out their primary functions. A diagrammatic representation of the Richards Concept is at Figure 2:
Figure 2. Diagrammatic Layout of Missile Battery (Richards Concept)
Developments from the Richards Concept
As the 80s progressed, it was realized that Lance was especially vulnerable to thermal imagery and the need to conceal the FSS was paramount. The British Army was developing thermal camouflage, but the priority was given to manoeuvre formations, rather than Corps Troops, of which the Regiment formed a part. Consideration was given to the best means of optimizing concealment from all possible sensors and a revision was made to the concept that utilized villages and factory complexes, to the exclusion of more open areas. This had the advantage of providing a high level of thermal clutter. Regimental folklore asserted that the thermal properties of a boxed warhead closely resembled that of a cow and so, for some time, large cow byres were the favored exclusion areas. During one Annual Operational Test exercise, a battery even deployed inside a disused supermarket, demolishing a doorway to gain access for the tracked vehicles and rebuilding it once inside. Problems that had to be addressed included:
The difficulty of upholding all the principles of defence in areas of limited visibility.
The size and nature of some of the vehicles.
Maintenance of a coherent defence when launcher sections deployed, taking with them a significant proportion of the manpower and small arms firepower of the Battery.
Space restrictions for carrying out technical operations coupled to the optimum arrangement for the weapon boxes.
The resulting concept led to diversity of solutions, depending not only on the ground, but also the particular views of the Battery Commander. For example, there were fundamental differences of opinion over the ideal method of arranging the exclusion area. There were proponents of digging-in all of the boxes, of ground dumping and of keeping all the rounds tied down on the vehicles. Permutations of all of these were exercised and each had advantages and disadvantages.
The Solution in Practice
Each Missile Battery had a peace time establishment of some 170 men and 82 vehicles. The Battery Commander was personally responsible for carrying out reconnaissance for the Battery position, embracing the exclusion zone, the FSS and any echelon positions. He sited the defence in detail, down to section positions and allocating arcs of responsibility and siting OPs. His SDG commander or Sergeant and his A&T Troop Sergeant Major generally accompanied him. The former provided specialist advice on the optimum use of his resources and the latter provided advice on the feasibility of technical operations within the confines of the chosen area. Their advice was frequently conflicting. Depending on the stage of operations, launcher sections could be incorporated into the FSS or already dispersed to close hides adjacent to firing positions.
Sequence of a Typical Mission. On receipt of the appropriate orders from the Corps Nuclear Operations Cell, individual Batteries would be given instructions to mate. The FSS Command Post generally received its orders by line from the Battery Command Post and transmitted them by voice to the A&T Section that was to undertake the mating drills. Mating could be carried out on the ground, with rounds partially boxed, directly onto a launcher vehicle, or onto a LT, depending on the tactical situation and the arrangement of the warhead boxes. The mated round, if mounted on the LT, would then be taken to a loading area close to the launcher position and trans-loaded onto the launcher. The launcher would move its close hide position, adjacent to the reconnoitered firing platform, to await firing data from the Battery Command Post. On receipt of firing data, the Lance Section Commander would carry out his time appreciation, working backwards from the Time to Fire, and would calculate the optimum time to occupy the platform without compromising security. Once the missile had been fired, in accordance with the appropriate Regimental Standing Operating Instruction, the Launcher Section would proceed as fast as possible to a remote location, either to trans-load from a LT or to another close hide to await further orders. The characteristic firing signature of the missile made alacrity essential during this phase.
Further Deployment Option
At the time of the Regiment’s loss of role in October 1991, it was engaged in a trial of dispersed Battery Positions. Thus evolved to counter compromise of the FSS and the consequent use of smart weapons against an increasingly vulnerable concentrated exclusion zone. The Battery Commander was required to split the Battery into groupings that had autonomy of operation within Nuclear Maneuver Areas (NMAs), which were bounded by a circle 5 kilometers from a point.
Groupings were determined by the Battery Commander depending upon the tactical situation, the ground and the resources available within the battery after casualties were presumed to have been taken. Each mini-FSS group was commanded by an officer or Senior Non-Commissioned Officer. Standing Instructions were given that each mini-FSS had to move every six hours within the NMA and move to a new NMA every 24 hours. It should be stressed that dispersed deployment was not intended to be initiated from the outset and would only be ordered when the circumstances warranted it; the inherent frequency of movement would quickly have rendered the Battery ineffective through fatigue and could contribute to hostile location. The concept is illustrated in Figure 3:
Figure 3. Dispersed Missile Battery
Ideal Grouping. The Battery was broken down into the following groups: a Battery Echelon, which carried that element of the prescribed Nuclear Load (PNL) remaining and including the Battery Commander’s Party and an element of the SDG; the Battery Command Post Group; and the mini-FSSs, which could consist of as little as one loaded launcher, one loaded LT and a small SDG detachment. US custodial teams accompanied each complete round, or group of warheads, unless general nuclear release had been ordered. In that case, the entire US Custodial detachment deployed at the main FSS group location.
Modus Operandi for the Smallest Viable mini-FSS. A suggested modus operandi for the smallest viable mini-FSS was as follows:
On receipt of orders from the Battery Commander, the group Commander was required to reconnoiter a mini-FSS. At the same time, the Reconnaissance and Survey pair set off to reconnoiter the first launcher position in the NMA.
Once the FSS location was found, preferably close to the first launcher position and acting as the launcher’s first hide, the group Commander called forward the reminder of the group to an RV, leading them in to occupy as fast as possible. The occupation included the establishment of an exclusion zone.
Once the mini-FSS was occupied, the reconnaissance process started again, with command of the position resting with the Launcher ‘Number One’ to fire missions as ordered.
On receipt of a mission, the essential elements of the group deployed to the firing platform and the remainder moved to the new location to set up and prepare the defenses. Re-loading of the launcher could take place either at the new location or at a pre-determined loading area.
Command and Control. The Battery Commander had responsibility for the overall command and control of the widely dispersed Battery. The Battery Captain was responsible for the Battery Echelon and command and control of each min-FSS was exercised by the group Commanders within their NMAs. There was no change to the passage of orders or information.
Summary
Tactical thinking in the nuclear artillery of 1st British Corps was a dynamic process that reacted to the evolving threat posed by technology. The original ‘Wagon Train’ concept whereby an effective defence was achieved though concentration of effort was superseded by a more structured defensive posture based upon concealment and a layered, infantry-style, layout. That, in turn, was in the process of replacement by a widely dispersed ‘penny-packet’ solution that envisaged a very hostile environment. The common thread in all of the solutions was the need to survive the initial stages of conflict in order to execute the mission at the required time.
Colonel P G Barry
October 2001
Commanding Officer,
50th Missile Regiment,
May 1991 to March 1993.